

CHAPTER XI: THE CEASEFIRE PERIOD IN WASHINGTON AND TAIPEI

The Chinese Communist announcement of a ceasefire on October 6 came, as was noted above, at a time when an American-escorted Chinese Nationalist convoy heavily loaded with 500 tons of supplies had already set sail from the Penghus for Quemoy. The convoy was designed to demonstrate Chinese Nationalist ability to break the blockade and had been designated "Special Convoy No. 1." Accompanied by U.S. escort, the convoy did not meet with enemy fire.<sup>1</sup>

Upon receiving word of the ceasefire on condition there be no American escort, U.S. officials in Taipei met among themselves and then with Chiang Kai-shek to consider whether or not the United States should suspend convoy operations. Smoot and Drumright conferred and agreed not to recommend any change in the U.S. escort policy. Drumright in his first message reported to Washington that a convoy under U.S. escort was on the way and that the cessation of Chinese Communist fire would aid its operation. He also reported that Chiang had requested Smoot to ignore the Peng statement, and to continue convoy operations, and that he and Smoot had agreed that this should be done.

Drumright warned Washington that any cessation of U.S. convoys would cause an immediate deterioration in U.S.-GRC relations.<sup>2</sup>

Smoot, who apparently felt very strongly about the matter, sent telegrams to CINCPAC and the CNO and, through State Department channels, to the Secretary of State. He declared that it was the determination of his staff that the United States should continue the escort despite the ceasefire pronouncement, and he described the ceasefire broadcast as an act of treachery.<sup>?</sup> He had told Chiang, he said, that he proposed to continue the escort. Chiang was opposed to withdrawal of the escort and asked Smoot to make his opposition known to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Smoot exercised his own authority to allow the escort, which had just left, to continue on its way to the three-mile limit, even though there was no Communist artillery fire. Smoot declared that he would continue the escort unless instructed otherwise. He warned in his message to the Secretary of State that U.S. withdrawal would have serious implications for U.S.-GRC relations and that therefore the United States should not suspend escorting without GRC agreement, which should be through diplomatic channels.<sup>3</sup>

Later in the day Chiang formally approached Drumright and Smoot with a request that the United States ignore the ceasefire broadcast and continue the escort. A letter was presented personally by Chiang to Smoot to go to the JCS and by the Chinese Nationalist Foreign Minister to Drumright to be passed to Dulles. The letters expressed the fear that U.S. pressures for the reduction of the garrison on Quemoy might lead the Chinese people to adopt an anti-U.S. attitude. The letter to Drumright warned that U.S. withdrawal of convoying would imply that the United States accepted the Chinese Communist position and that this would elicit strong GRC protests that would be made public. The Chinese Nationalists nevertheless pledged that they would refrain from retaliatory action as long as the Chinese Communists did so. In passing on this message, Drumright made it clear that he was opposed to suspending convoy escorts, although he indicated that it might be possible to announce a reduction in the number of U.S. ships involved.<sup>4</sup>

Chiang announced publicly that the GRC would continue to convoy and expressed the hope that the United States would continue to escort.<sup>5</sup>

At the same time that American officials on Taiwan were coming to the firm conclusion that the United States should not suspend convoy operations, officials in Washington were making the decision that the convoy operations should be suspended.

Burke, apparently before having a chance to consult with State, notified CINCPAC and TDC that in view of the ceasefire broadcast, the TDC should consult the GRC and, unless there were strenuous objections, should halt the convoy escorts. At the same time he urged the GRC to engage in a maximum effort to supply the Offshore Islands and declared that the United States should avoid provocative action and encourage the GRC to do likewise. Smoot was asked to request the GRC to engage in no overflights or leaflet drops during the week. At the same time, the TDC was ordered to have MAAG personnel survey the situation on all the Offshore Islands and at the same time to be prepared for tricks by the Chinese Communists and to maintain current readiness.<sup>6</sup>

After consultation between State and Navy, it was decided, at the insistence of State,<sup>7</sup> that U.S. convoy operations would be suspended regardless of GRC oppo-

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was sent to CINCPAC and the TDC. However, they were ordered to be ready to resume convoys if the shelling resumed. Otherwise there would be no convoy operations necessary.<sup>8</sup> Drumright was informed that the Chinese Communist move had not been revealed to the United States at Warsaw and that he might tell this to Chiang.<sup>9</sup>

Drumright was told that the United States was suspending convoy operations since they were not militarily necessary. He was informed that world opinion made the suspension necessary and he was requested to urge the GRC to build up supplies on the Offshore Islands.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, the U.S. Government, through a State Department spokesman, welcomed the ceasefire and said it would suspend U.S. convoy operations if the artillery fire were halted permanently. It was announced that the United States was consulting with the GRC.<sup>11</sup>

On October 7 Drumright reported that the GRC was upset at the American decision to suspend escorts. The GRC had expressed the hope that public statements in Washington would stress the point that the port would be resumed if the artillery fire were started again. The GRC had also inquired what the U.S. position would be

if there were an air and sea attack on a convoy to Quemoy. Drumright noted that the GRC expected a resumption of artillery fire after seven days, followed by an amphibious attack.<sup>12</sup>

Dulles returned to Washington on October 7 and was again met at the airport by Herter and Robertson, who discussed the ceasefire situation with him.<sup>13</sup> During the week of the ceasefire, officials in Washington continued to urge restraint on the GRC. For example, in a personal message to Drumright, Dulles declared, "I assume everything possible has been done to assure that over coming hours and days Nationalists will hold their fire unless attacked and will avoid provocative action."<sup>14</sup>

In response to this, Drumright reported that he and Smoot had sought all possible opportunities to urge the GRC to avoid provocation. He reported that all as well except in the air, where the GRC was being provocative.

On October 10, for example, eleven GRC planes were sent over the mainland, despite a Ministry of National Defense directive forbidding such operations.<sup>15</sup>

U.S. military officials on Taiwan took advantage of the ceasefire to explore the supply situation on Quemoy and to re-evaluate the situation with respect to stabilizing

it. On October 6 a long-awaited Nike-Hercules missile unit with nuclear warheads arrived on Taiwan.<sup>16</sup> An American military official was quoted as stating that atomic warheads accompanied the missiles,<sup>17</sup> but this was later denied by a Defense Department official in Washington,<sup>18</sup> and by a U.S. military official on Taiwan.<sup>19</sup> C/E

Under the urging of the United States, the Chinese Nationalists carried out extensive supply operations during the period of the ceasefire. Plans were made to land approximately 1,000 tons per day.<sup>20</sup> On October 8, 1,300 tons were landed.<sup>21</sup> The Nationalists were reported to have silenced their guns on the Offshore Islands and to be prepared to hold their fire unless fired upon.<sup>22</sup> They also halted leaflet drops and most reconnaissance flights.<sup>23</sup>

On October 8 the Chief of the Army Section of the Taiwan Defense Command visited Quemoy and found "no problem whatsoever in supply."<sup>24</sup> He declared that he was "amazed by the small degree of damage." Civilian areas except those near the airport were untouched. He reported that morale was higher than in the pre-August 23 period and that there was a complete success in supply of

the Islands. He stated that 307 tons of supplies, including ammunition, were used per day, and that this amount could be delivered even if the blockade were resumed.<sup>25</sup>

On October 11 the process of developing operations plans for conventional activity, which had begun on August 25 with the Presidential directive to prepare for possible conventional operations, was continued with the publication of Annex 8 to TDC OPS PLAN 25-58, which provided for a conventional war supplement to the original TDC OPS PLAN.<sup>26</sup>

The Chinese Communist announcement of a ceasefire and the U.S. suspension of convoying brought to light an issue which U.S. military officials on Taiwan had successfully kept in the background during this entire period--the question of what U.S. policy was on defense of the smaller Offshore Islands, in particular the Tans. On October 9 Felt expressed his concern to the Chief of Naval Operations that Chiang might not have been informed of U.S. intentions not to be involved in support of the non-principal Offshore Islands because of Department of State instructions (a State Department telegram to Taipei had specifically ordered that there be no discussion of



military outposts which could be abandoned without jeopardizing the Offshore Islands. Chiang had sought a U.S. air drop on Ta-tan and Erh-tan, but Felt had refused. He expressed the belief that the Tans should be evacuated.<sup>28</sup>

On the same day, Smoot reported that he was still urging evacuation of the Tans and, if asked to help defend them, would refuse since defense of the islands would be silly from the military standpoint and he could not recommend that the GRC try to defend them. In his judgment the current understanding between the GRC and the United States would permit the GRC to bomb the mainland without specific American permission if the Chinese Communists bombed the smaller islands while the GRC was evacuating them. The Taiwan Defense Commander stated that he believed that the GRC did not realize this and that he would not tell them until and unless an appropriate time occurred.<sup>29</sup>

On October 10 Drumright expressed his concern with this issue and noted that the GRC was not likely to evacuate the Tans. He expressed the view that the United States should not tell the GRC to evacuate them but should

it a request to help defend them and that when this

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happened the United States should react strictly on military grounds through the TDC.<sup>30</sup>

Between October 12 and 14, Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy was on Taiwan conferring with Chiang Kai-shek. During one meeting, Chiang expressed his fear that the United States would give away something in Warsaw, and declared that what to do with the Offshore Islands was entirely a matter for the GRC to decide. He feared that the United States was negotiating a deal and that he would like to be consulted. At this point the United States was beginning to think in terms of bringing about some reduction in the size of the Quemoy garrison, and McElroy sounded out Chiang on this point. Chiang left Drumright, who was at the meeting, with the impression that the Nationalists would accept a military argument as to why the forces on Quemoy should be reduced but would have no part of a political settlement involving their reduction. Drumright felt that what had emerged from the conversation was that Chiang might withdraw some troops in return for a U.S. declaration to defend the Offshore Islands and the supplying of better equipment to the Offshore Islands.

At the same meeting Chiang expressed the hope that Dulles would visit Taiwan.<sup>31</sup> Dulles had been planning to make such a visit and it was probable that McElroy and Drumright maneuvered to get Chiang to make this request, although at the same time it was probably true that Chiang, having a poor impression as to what Dulles' purpose would be, was anxious to have a Dulles visit at this time.\*

On October 15 and 16, with Dulles due to arrive shortly in Taiwan for talks with Chiang Kai-shek, evaluations of the situation were sent by Smoot and Felt. Smoot reported that resupply had in fact never been a problem. The panic had been created, not by the Nationalist military, but by the GRC's use of the incident to involve the United States in their never-to-die hope of returning to the mainland. With reference to the smaller islands, Smoot declared that the United States should stand firm and that it should let the GRC know that there were certain islands we did not consider worth defending. On the question of whether or not the United States should

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\* As will be indicated below, Dulles had already told GRC Ambassador Yeh that he would like to visit Taiwan, and the GRC had sent instruction to Yeh to invite Dulles.

press for a reduction in the size of the Quemoy garrison, Smoot expressed the view that political arguments for reducing the garrison on the Offshore Islands would be dangerous, but he noted that there were good military arguments, which he was prepared to make.<sup>32\*</sup>

On the next day Felt reported that the Chinese Communists had made an erroneous estimate when they determined that heavy artillery bombardment would reduce the Quemoy garrison to the point of evacuation or surrender. He expressed his view that the traditional Chinese Communist Army faith in artillery fire was here demonstrated but noted that the 500,000 rounds which were fired in fact did only minor damage and were not able to prevent resupply. He said that the United States should not press too hard for a GRC reduction on the Offshore Islands and should be willing to strengthen GRC forces.<sup>34</sup>

#### REACTION TO THE CEASEFIRE IN WASHINGTON

With the decision to halt convoy escort during the ceasefire period, Washington officials turned to the

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\* Smoot later declared that there were no good military arguments and requested and received permission to negotiate troop reduction.<sup>33</sup>

question of what further moves the United States should make in light of the termination of the immediate crisis. A meeting of State Department officials, including Dulles, Herter, Murphy, Smith, Reinhardt, Macomber, Robertson, Parsons, and Green, was held on the afternoon of October 8.<sup>35</sup> Dulles led off the discussion by indicating his belief that the ceasefire would be extended beyond one week. He argued that acquisition of the Offshore Islands by the Chinese Communists would be a great victory. His view was challenged only by Gerard Smith, head of the Policy Planning Staff, who noted that if the GRC abandoned the Offshore Islands it would strengthen a two-China policy and rob the Communists of their ability to shake things up whenever they wanted to. He proposed evacuating the Islands and stronger American guarantees for Taiwan.

Dulles strongly disagreed with Smith's proposal. He noted that the ceasefire was being hailed as a great victory for American policy. Though rejecting the total evacuation of the Islands, Dulles thought that the United States might use its leverage to gain a reduction in the size of the Quemoy garrison. He noted that Chiang must be made to realize that he had had a narrow escape since the American Government had had to strain its relations

with Congress and its allies almost to the breaking point in order to save him. Dulles asserted that a reduction in the size of the garrison would be aimed at impressing public opinion in the United States and elsewhere, and that the United States must continue to seek public support for its policy. The Secretary of State declared that the Government could not permit this situation to arise again. "It was agonizing," he said.

Moving beyond a possible reduction in the size of the Quemoy garrison, Dulles suggested that the Offshore Islands might be demilitarized if the Chinese Communists pledged not to seize them. The pledge would be underwritten by countries now recognizing Peking who would agree to sever relations and perhaps join with other countries in imposing economic sanctions if the Communists seized the Islands. Robertson objected to the plan, noting in any case that the Chinese Communists would not accept it and that it would be difficult to find any countries which recognized Peking which would also be willing to make the threat suggested by Dulles. Noting that the issue was U.S. support for the GRC, Robertson also opposed the suggestion made by Herter

that the United States put pressure on the GRC then and there to evacuate the smaller islands in the Quemoy group.

Dulles noted that acceptance of a two-China situation by the GRC might come sometime in the future when the Army was Taiwanese. He returned to his theme of GRC provocations and asked if Beam had ever asked Wang what provocations the Chinese Communists wanted removed; he stressed the importance of trying to pin Wang down on this. Finally, Dulles asked Robertson to look into the problem of the smaller islands in light of the report that Smoot had recommended a build-up on the Tans to the GRC.<sup>36</sup>

Two days after the State Department meeting, Dulles met with the Joint Chiefs and other Administration officials at the Pentagon. Dulles began by proposing that the group consider various possible moves, including a reduction of the Quemoy garrison, but he indicated that no action should be taken under pressure. He said how large a garrison was necessary and was told by Taylor that the garrison could be safely reduced from estimated strength of about 85,000 to 25,000.

Allen Dulles noted that the shells fired during the crisis cost the Communists \$25,000,000. The shells came from Russia and the Chinese were paying for them.\* He thought that if the Quemoy garrison were reduced in size, the Taiwanese might be removed. The Secretary of State stressed that the President believed that the Islands should be treated as an outpost and should not become another Dien-Bien-Phu. Dulles voiced his belief that the GRC could play an active role in a Hungarian-type revolution. He asked if a reduction in the garrison were satisfactory from a military point of view. Twining replied that it was, provided that it did not appear to be a retreat. The meeting concluded with general agreement that a reduction in the GRC garrison and greater mobility for GRC forces would be pressed if the ceasefire continued.<sup>38</sup>

In conversation with GRC Ambassador Yeh just prior to the interdepartmental meeting, Dulles underlined the problem of allied support. He stressed that the United

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\* This information is at variance with a post-crisis intelligence analysis by the Army, which came to the conclusion that the shells used were all manufactured in China.<sup>37</sup>



States Government had to have the support of its people and its allies, and he asked the GRC to consider initiatives in regard to its Offshore Islands policy. Dulles also told Yeh that he would like to go to Taipei to talk with Chiang.<sup>39</sup>

On October 12, with the original first-week ceasefire period drawing to a close, Dulles had a classified conversation with the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Theodore Green, which apparently reflected rather accurately Dulles' views of what the crisis was about and what had taken place thus far. Dulles told Green that the Chinese Communist objective was to eliminate U.S. influence in the Western Pacific and was not limited to the Offshore Islands. He declared that the current operation was similar to the Berlin blockade and that the Chinese Communists had taken limited measures, i.e., artillery interdiction. Dulles went on to say that the GRC had not solved the resupply problem but were on the verge of doing so when the ceasefire was declared. Therefore the Chinese Communists were faced with a choice of continuing their expensive effort or accepting a ceasefire. The alternative to these two was the use of air power against Quemoy.

However, Dulles continued, the Chinese Communists recognized that if this were done, the GRC Air Force would attack the planes and probably the bases. In turn, the Chinese Communists would bomb Taiwan, and this would bring in the United States, which the Chinese Communists did not want.

He declared that the basic issues remained, but that they did not have to be settled then. As for allied support, Dulles told Senator Green that the Japanese were privately supporting a strong U.S. position.\* He noted, in a rather self-revealing comment, that the Japanese had no religion and hence were guided exclusively by expediency and respect for strength. He stated that the Filipinos were also giving strong support.

Dulles stated further that the resupply had been difficult because the United States had not trained the GRC in amphibious work. He declared that the existence of Chiang would be useful in a Hungarian-type situation and that in fact the outcome in Hungary would have been quite different if there had been a Hungarian Army outside Hungary.

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\* I am not clear on what Dulles' view was based. All I have seen indicates that the Japanese were

He told Green that no commitment had been made to defend Quemoy and that there was a limit as to how hard we could push the GRC, for example, in getting them to evacuate the Islands. He said that if we pushed too hard, they would make a deal with the Chinese Communists and that this was very much on his mind and had to be taken into consideration in framing U.S. policy.<sup>40</sup>

In his discussion with Green, Dulles stressed the two points which were very much on his mind at this point. One was the need to take some steps to eliminate the possibility of a renewal of the crisis and to show that the United States was peaceful. Therefore Dulles felt that the United States should make some move toward reducing provocative actions in the Taiwan Straits. At the same time Dulles was conscious of pressure from the other side, from the Chinese Nationalists, who, he recognized, would bitterly resist any effort to make major changes in the status in the Straits.

On October 13 Dulles met with GRC Ambassador Yeh and was told that Chiang would be glad to have him visit Taipei. He was told that Chiang would like a visit followed by a short communication indicating agreement.

Dulles noted that the danger was now political and told Yeh that American military officers believed the Army garrison should be reduced.<sup>41</sup> He also talked with Burke by phone and suggested that it might now be appropriate to reduce American forces in the Taiwan Straits area. Burke said that the Navy was thinking along the same lines.<sup>42</sup> Later in the day the National Security Council met and Dulles conferred alone with the President.\* He then met with his State Department staff.<sup>43</sup>

With the feeling that the military crisis in the Taiwan Straits was at an end and having arranged to visit Taipei to talk with Chiang Kai-shek, Dulles wrote out a paper outlining his thoughts on what GRC policy should be. This was to form the basis of his negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek later in the month. He began by listing the seven roles of the GRC in which the United States was cooperating. These were:

- (1) To keep the anti-Communist Government on Taiwan strong enough to withstand any Communist assault.

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\*No information on what was discussed at these two meetings is available to me.

- (2) To prevent more Chinese from being forcefully subjected to Communist tyranny.
- (3) To be ready to help the Chinese on the mainland if the opportunity presented itself as a result of organized dissatisfaction.
- (4) To stimulate the possibility of revolt on the mainland by making Taiwan a model of political, economic and social welfare.
- (5) To keep the overseas Chinese from becoming a tool of Peking.
- (6) "To preempt the seat of China in the United Nations so that it would not go to the Chinese Communists, giving them increased prestige and influence in the world."
- (7) To preserve Chinese culture.

Dulles went on in the memorandum as to what could be done in relation to the Offshore Islands to accomplish the objectives. He expressed the hope that a de facto armistice could develop on both sides which would make possible an appreciable reduction of force on the Offshore Islands. He then pointed out the belief that the problem of creating a de facto armistice between the Taiwan

Straits and reducing forces would have on the previous seven points. The effect would be as follows:

(1) There would be no problem of Taiwan if the matter were handled by the GRC as its program not a U.S. program it accepted by coercion.

(2) Some appreciable reduction of forces under the conditions suggested would give comparable security to what now exists. There would be enough forces left not only to maintain internal security, but to put up a substantial resistance. The number left behind could at any time be augmented from Taiwan particularly if additional amphibious power were provided.

It would be a necessary accompaniment of the foregoing that the CHINATS should make clear that they did not intend to use the offshore islands for provocative purposes. Actually, there is very little "provocation" now by the CHINATS in the offshore islands. They are not used for purposes of blockading the ports of Amoy and Foochow. Also these mainland areas are so heavily militarized and so forbidding in their geographical formation that they do not serve as a useful place for staging commando raids or introducing intelligence agents much less for an invasion in aid of a future revolt.

It is possible--not probable--that other free nations which now have diplomatic relations with the CHICOMS could be induced to indicate to the CHICOMS that they would break these relations and throw their support to the CHINATS if the CHICOMS again break the peace by a major war effort to capture the offshore islands.

It should be observed in this connection that the offshore islands are not covered by the United States--Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty, and the President is not authorized to use the Armed Forces for their defense unless he judges it is necessary and appropriate for the defense of Taiwan. Thus the Chinese Communists, by disassociating attacks on the Quemoy and Matsu islands from their claims for Taiwan and Penghu, could automatically exclude United States armed participation in defense

of the offshore islands. This makes it the more important to develop increased and broader political pressures on the CHICOMS not to engage in a further arms attack on the offshore islands.

(3) As regards point three, the ability of the CHINATS would be increased with less division of their forces, with more located at a focal point such as Taiwan. From there they could be either redeployed to the offshore islands rather than be demobilized on the offshore islands.

The amphibious equipment which would make a return to the offshore islands more possible would equally serve to permit their being landed elsewhere if this was appropriate to give aid and comfort to a substantial organized resistance movement.

(4) As regards point four, the change would have some benefit in that it would tend to moderate what otherwise could be a source of division on Taiwan and between the Chinese who regard Taiwan as their home, and the recent arrivals who regard the mainland as their home. There is some evidence that the Taiwanese are not enthusiastic about the present dispositions which can require many of them to die for the defense of the offshore islands in which they have no sentimental interest.

(5-6) As regards points five and six, we believe that some move along the lines indicated is important, almost essential, to prevent more and more nations from recognizing the CHICOMS and bringing them into the U.N. There is great dissatisfaction in the present situation among many nations which, in deference to the U.S., do not recognize the CHICOMS. They strongly deprecate a situation which, as they see it, involves them in the risk of a world war because of the military dispositions of the CHINATS which, in their opinion, are unnecessarily provocative. They look upon the CHINATS use of the offshore islands as carrying a constant invasion threat to the mainland, or, at a minimum, a threat to the integrity of the mainland China's principal ports, and they are sympathetic with the efforts of the CHICOMS to eliminate these threats. Actually, as noted, these threats are non-existent. But it is much better that the CHINATS show themselves

take steps which would emphasize the reality and do so on their own volition, rather than to lose good will with disastrous political consequences on account of maintaining a paper threat which in reality is non-existent.

(7) As regards point seven there is no particular bearing one way or the other because the place where Chinese culture is being preserved is Taiwan not on the offshore islands.<sup>44</sup>

As we shall see, these views of Dulles were to be reflected in his conversations with Chiang Kai-shek.

On the 13th the State Department sent a long telegram to its Embassy in India asking it to convey information to the Indian Government while making it clear that the United States did not want a mediator in the crisis at that time.

It informed the U.S. Ambassador to India that the Indian Ambassador to Peking was being given an incorrect account of the situation by the Chinese Communists. He had been told, for example, that the Chinese Communists could have taken the Offshore Islands in 1955 because they were lightly armed; actually they were as heavily armed then as they were now. He was also told that the Chinese Communists hoped to acquire the Offshore Islands through the Warsaw talks and to settle the Taiwan question with Chiang Kai-shek. In point of fact, the



Chinese Communists refused to discuss the Offshore Islands or the renunciation of force in the Taiwan Straits at the Warsaw talks.

The Ambassador was also authorized to inform the Indians that Communist China had not replied to the American letter of July 28 notifying them of Beam's appointment and their willingness to reopen the talks until after the September 6 statement by Chou En-lai. The Indian Ambassador to Peking had been told that the Chinese Nationalists were interfering with shipping and undertaking other provocations from the Offshore Islands and that this was the reason for the shelling. However, as pointed out in this message to New Delhi, the last increase in troops on Quemoy was in 1955. In addition, it was pointed out that the Chinese Nationalists had discontinued attempts to blockade since early 1956 and that the Offshore Islands had no airfields usable by jet planes.<sup>45</sup>

At a press conference on October 14, Dulles declared that there was no point in bargaining with the Chinese Communists over the future of the Offshore Islands or the size of the Quemoy garrison. The Secretary of State denied that there were any plans to urge Chiang to reduce

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the size of the GRC garrison on Quemoy. Dulles said that the Communist suspension of the ceasefire for two more weeks was not "dependable."<sup>46</sup> He stated:

The United States welcomes the Chinese Communist decision of October 12 to continue to suspend the shelling of Quemoy. We hope that this suspension will in fact be for more than the 2 weeks mentioned. Short suspensions of armed attack do not provide a solid foundation upon which to stabilize the situation in the interest of peace.<sup>47</sup>

On October 15 Eisenhower at a press conference briefly endorsed the views given by Dulles to the press on the previous day. The President noted that there was no indication that the GRC would agree (as they later did) to reduce the size of their Quemoy garrison in return for an increase in its fire power.<sup>48</sup>

On October 16 Dulles continued staff meetings on the situation in the Taiwan Straits and on his position paper for his trip to Taiwan.<sup>49</sup>

On the next day it was announced in Washington that Dulles would visit Chiang the following week accompanied by Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East Walter Robertson.<sup>50</sup> Dulles left that evening to attend the funeral of Pope Pius before going to Taiwan.<sup>51</sup> An

indication that the Dulles trip was planned on the assumption that the crisis was over may be found in the fact that the special daily Situation Reports prepared for the President were suspended as of October 17.<sup>52\*</sup>

#### THE DULLES VISIT TO TAIWAN

On October 21 Dulles arrived in Taiwan for a series of intensive meetings with Chiang Kai-shek and U.S. officials. Upon arrival, he issued a statement indicating that the talks were not aimed at reaching any new agreements but simply at consolidating a relationship of mutual trust and confidence.<sup>53</sup>

The day before Dulles' arrival on Taiwan, the Chinese Communists announced the resumption of artillery fire against the Offshore Islands, claiming it was the result of an intrusion of U.S. ship into Chinese waters. They continued the fire during the whole time of Dulles' visit to Taiwan.

Thus the Dulles-Chiang conversations, which had been expected to be carried on in an atmosphere in which the

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However, they were resumed when the shelling began

military phase of the crisis was clearly over, took place in a slightly different climate. It was clear to everyone then that the shelling could not isolate Quemoy, and the discussions apparently proceeded in very much the same form as they would have if the Chinese Communists had not resumed their fire. Dulles consulted with Eisenhower by phone from Alaska, on route to Taiwan, when the shelling broke out, and it was agreed that he should continue his trip. It was also announced that the United States would not immediately resume escort operations.<sup>54</sup>

Prior to meeting with Chiang, Dulles held several meetings with the U.S. officials on Taiwan as well as with those who had accompanied him to the Island, including Chief of Staff of the Army General Maxwell Taylor. Taylor reported to the JCS that Dulles requested a briefing about the effect of a possible air attack on Quemoy. The briefer, a member of the Taiwan Defense Command, said that the TDC had concluded that an air attack on Quemoy would not be decisive. The Taiwan Defense Command believed that it should be countered by an air attack limited to the vicinity of Quemoy since the Chinese Communist airfield: could not be cratered

without atomic weapons.<sup>55</sup> After this morning briefing, Dulles lunched with Taylor and the senior American officials on the Island, including Smoot, Drumright and Ray Cline.<sup>56</sup> Dulles then met with Drumright and Robertson to go over the talking paper he had drafted earlier in the day for his meeting with Chiang. Though some minor changes were made, the specific requests to the GRC were left as originally drafted by Dulles.<sup>57</sup>

In his first meeting with Chiang on the 21st at 4:00 p.m., Dulles began by speaking along the lines of a talking paper which he was to present in full to Chiang on the 22d. He began by congratulating the GRC on its successful defense of Quemoy. Dulles indicated that the great danger to the GRC was political, stemming from world feeling that the GRC wanted to threaten peace. Dulles expressed his view that the GRC could have an assured future if it made clear that its counter-attacks on the mainland were based on considerations for "the minds and souls of 600 million Chinese and not on might." Dulles stressed that the GRC must present a peaceful image.

Dulles went on to express his thanks but not surprise at GRC restraint during the operation. He noted

his belief that it would be possible to continue the military defense, that the interdiction bombardment and could be overcome, and that any amphibious assault on Quemoy could and would be repulsed.\* He implied that an air attack on Taiwan would invoke a joint response. In each case Dulles stressed that the method used would be only that necessary for successful repulsion of the operation.

Chiang, in reacting to Dulles' statement, noted that he and his policies had been misunderstood, and that the United States had shown a lack of confidence in him. He felt that any decisions made now should be private. He stated that he did not want a world war to free China, and he agreed on the principle of not attacking the mainland by air. Dulles replied that while even some U.S. officials on Taiwan suspected Chiang of trying to involve the United States in a war, he did not share this view. Chiang admitted that he was aware of these suspicions and deeply resented them. He noted that the on-again off-again attacks affected Quemoy

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\* Dulles' comments while stating that an amphibious assault on Quemoy could be repulsed did not make it clear that the United States would participate.

morale and declared in conclusion that if Quemoy were lost, the effect on Taiwan would be disastrous and defense would crumble.<sup>58</sup> Dulles and Chiang met again informally for dinner that evening.<sup>59</sup>

Taylor reported to his colleagues in the JCS that the Dulles-Chiang talks were being conducted on a very private basis with no military officials present. However, Dulles briefed the group after his meeting with Chiang on the 21st, telling them that he had raised the question of reducing forces on the Offshore Islands after the firing ended. He expressed his view that it was neither practical nor necessary to reduce the garrisons to the point of being lightly held outposts and he asked the military to work out a solution to reduce the garrison by about 15,000 or 20,000 men.<sup>60</sup>

During their first meeting on October 22, which was held at 10:30 a.m., Dulles read to Chiang the full text of the talking paper which he had prepared. The paper began by noting that the greatest danger to the GRC was political, stemming from the world feeling that the GRC wanted war. It declared that the GRC could have an assured future if it made clear that its ultimate

purposes were not military. The GRC's image must be a peaceful one. This part of the talking paper, as noted, had been read by Dulles to Chiang at their meeting on the 21st without it being clear that it was from a formal paper. On the 22d Dulles read the entire paper and then left it with Chiang. The paper recommended the following provisions, among others, for creating a peaceful image:

- (1) The GRC will conduct itself as if there were a de facto armistice and will proclaim that it is willing to conclude an armistice.
- (2) The GRC will re-emphasize that it will not by forceful means initiate a return to the mainland.
- (3) The GRC will avoid commando raids and overflights.
- (4) The GRC will accept any solution of the Offshore Islands problem that does not turn them over to the Chinese Communists. The GRC will not use the Offshore Islands to prosecute the civil war, for example, by blockading Amoy or Focchow, or as a jumping off point to the mainland.
- (5) Forces on the Offshore Islands will be revised to make them more mobile.



(6) Education, art and culture will be emphasized.

The talking paper continued:

Thus the GRC can better thwart the materialistic efforts of the CPR on the mainland; it can be a symbol which the mainland will observe and envy; attract more lasting support on Taiwan; can better hold loyalty of overseas Chinese; and can make itself into something which not only the U.S. but the free peoples everywhere will want to stand for and cherish.

And the paper was signed "John Foster Dulles."<sup>61</sup>

After presenting the paper, Dulles stated that the GRC must make clear its willingness to work for an armistice. He declared that blame for disturbing the peace must be put on the Chinese Communists and that unless the GRC moved in this direction many nations would switch their recognition of the GRC to the Chinese Communists. To prevent this, the GRC must take steps along the lines suggested in the paper.

Chiang agreed to consider the paper but noted that his Government, as a revolutionary one, attached great importance to principle.<sup>62</sup>

At this meeting and the one that was to be held later in the day, Dulles was accompanied by Drumright and Robertson from the Department of State, but on other of these occasions were American military officers

present. Between the Dulles-Chiang meeting and the meeting at 7:00 p.m., Chinese Nationalist Foreign Minister Huang met with Drumright and told him that the Chinese Communists wanted all the Pacific. He said that the Chinese Nationalists had exercised great restraint and would not oppose a de facto ceasefire. He indicated, however, that the suggestions advanced by Dulles had shaken the foundations of the Republic of China. They were tantamount, he declared, to a voluntary acceptance of the two-China idea, which would cause the GRC to lose the support of the Chinese on the mainland. If the GRC had to choose between the loss of support of China by espousing a two-China principle and losing the support of the free world, it would choose the latter course.<sup>63</sup> At the same meeting, Drumright gave to the Chinese Nationalists the U.S. draft of the proposed communiqué to be issued at the conclusion of the Dulles-Chiang conversations.

During the same day Dr. Sun met at the Embassy with U.S. authorities on Taiwan. At a meeting with military officials it was noted that the GRC had agreed to the withdrawal of 18,000 men, which is one full division of

12,000 men, and to the reduction of one thousand each from the remaining six divisions. In return the United States would supply more guns, including twelve 240-mm. howitzers. Dulles agreed that the howitzers could go in after the agreement was made but before the reductions were carried out.<sup>65</sup>

Dulles' special assistant and his official spokesman for the trip, Joseph Nathaniel Greene, told the press on Taiwan that the first meeting between Dulles and Chiang had been devoted to an assessment of the situation, including a discussion of several political and military matters. He denied that Dulles had come to Taipei to persuade the GRC to change any of its policies.<sup>66</sup>

On the evening of the 22d, Dulles met with Chiang and some of his subordinates, as well as some other State Department officials, in order to hear Chiang's response to the Dulles talking paper. Chiang began by noting that he expected the on-again, off-again firing to continue. He declared that this was a device for paralyzing morale and in the long run could be very effective. Three or four months of this could be very serious and would have an adverse effect on the chances of Quemoy.

There was a need, he said, to strengthen the Quemoy garrison with more guns. Dulles replied that the United States was considering supplying more guns but that no one in the United States believed that conventional weapons could knock out the deeply emplaced guns of the Chinese Communists, that only nuclear weapons could do this. Dulles asked whether Chiang wanted the United States to use nuclear weapons. Chiang replied that it was not necessary to use nuclear weapons, though the use of tactical atomic weapons might be advisable. Dulles said that no tactical atomic weapons in existence could knock out the gun emplacements. To use a bomb such as the one exploded at Hiroshima (i.e., 20 kt.) would kill millions of people, and heavy all-out and casualties would result from exploding on the ground, as would have to be done if the gun emplacements were to be destroyed.\* Chiang admitted that he was not a nuclear expert, but he felt that some third way should be found as an alternative to either an all-out attack or doing

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\*Dulles was later to check this evaluation with the JCS and to learn that the guns could be taken out with far fewer casualties.

nothing at all. Dulles declared that the Chinese Communist attacks were not effective. Chiang said that he agreed but that the problem was one of morale and that positive action was needed.

Returning to the question of the use of atomic weapons, Dulles said that these could knock out the guns around Quemoy but would probably kill "very many people."\* Chiang admitted that he had not found any solution. Dulles repeated that only nuclear weapons could take out the gun emplacements and went on to say that the use of nuclear weapons would involve nuclear attacks on Taiwan, which, in turn, would completely destroy the island. Chiang declared that the Chinese Nationalists might have to bomb supply lines to the Amoy area. Dulles stated that the United States was studying the possibility of providing better guns. Chiang cautioned that the patience of the defenders on Quemoy might break and that they could act on their own. The meeting concluded with Dulles observing that the best solution was an armistice. 67

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\* In an original typescript version of the memorandum of conversation, this statement read "kill a million people." It was changed before the minutes of the meeting were dittoed to "very many people."

On the morning of the 23rd, Dulles had his final meeting with Chiang. The only other person present was GRC Ambassador Yeh, who served as interpreter. Dulles declared that the whole fate of Free China should not be identified with holding a few square miles of highly vulnerable territory. Chiang retorted that if Quemoy were lost, Free China was lost. Dulles rejected this causal relationship. Chiang responded that Taiwan could not be held after Quemoy fell, that Communist agents on Taiwan would bring about the fall of the Government within five months. He said he could guarantee the defense of Quemoy, but only with current U.S. support. Dulles declared that no one could guarantee indefinitely the defense of an island in that position. Chiang asked what could be done to prevent an on-again, off-again attack on the Islands. Dulles, returning to nuclear questions, declared that only ground-burst nuclear weapons could effectively take out the guns and that this would kill most of the people on Quemoy by fallout. He suggested reducing the garrison as a sound political and military move. Chiang stated he was prepared to move in this direction if hostilities stopped, but that it was

impossible to do so under fire. Dulles expressed the hope that a reduction of 15,000 to 20,000 men, which was being discussed, could be brought about. Chiang expressed the hope that the United States would consult him before making any decisions and not do anything which depreciated his prestige. In dictating a memorandum of this conversation, Dulles reported that he interpreted Chiang's remark as a reference to the Eisenhower and Dulles press conferences. He pointed out to Chiang that answers to loaded questions at press conferences were difficult and urged Chiang to look instead at considered State papers. Chiang declared that the renunciation of force was a very important milestone and that free nations should not risk war as a means of promoting their own policies.<sup>68</sup>

Following the meeting, a joint communiqué was issued which closely followed the proposed American draft given by Drumright on the 22d, with several significant changes. Apparently at the request of the Chinese Nationalists at a meeting between Drumright and the GRC officials, a sentence was added, stating that "it was recognized that under present conditions the defense of the Quemoy together with the Matsus, is closely related to the defense of Taiwan and Pengu." Added was the specific

charge that the Chinese Communists with the support of the Soviet Union were trying to conquer Taiwan, eliminate Free China, and expel the United States from the rest of the Pacific. The following U.S. proposed sentences were eliminated.

The Government of the Republic of China made it clear that it rejects the conception that its high mission, as a representative of Free China, can be carried out through war. It will never itself initiate war to reestablish its authority upon the mainland and never fight save in the defense of those who freely accept its jurisdiction. The Republic of China has no military bases for attacks on the mainland. Its bases are already on the mainland and in the minds and the hearts of the Chinese people. These it will seek to sustain by its conduct and example.

Substituted for that was a statement in which the Government of the Republic of China declared that the principal means of achieving its objective was the implementation of Sun Yat Sen's three principles and "not the use of force."<sup>69</sup>

After issuing the communiqué, Dulles in an off-the-record conference with the American press on Taipei stressed the basic unity of the United States and the GRC. He pointed to the importance of spelling out the renunciation of force by the GRC and stated that the



Warsaw talks had not been discontinued. He stressed that there would be reciprocity if there was a continuing ceasefire.<sup>70</sup>

Taylor, in reporting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on these Dulles-Chiang meetings, noted that the major achievement was in the words of the communiqué: "not the use of force." Dulles had informed Taylor, in a meeting right after his final conversation with Chiang, that Chiang had raised the question of the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the coastal batteries and in ensuing discussions had shown a complete ignorance of atomic weapon effects. Dulles spoke to Taylor and the military officials on Taiwan about the need to brief Chiang on the elementary facts of nuclear weapons.<sup>71\*</sup>

On the same day, Drumright reported that the request to reduce the garrison had made a good start and that, if kept in military channels and as a military matter, it

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\*This caused considerable confusion on Taiwan. On October 25 the Taiwan Defense Command requested guidance from Washington as to how to brief Chiang. On the 25th Smoot was informed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been told by Dulles of his request to the Taiwan Defense Command to brief Chiang. The message to Smoot indicated that a briefing would shortly be forwarded to Taiwan. After several additional exchanges of messages, Burke in a personal message to Smoot advised him to give a briefing which would emphasize the political implications of Chiang's request to use nuclear weapons.

stood a good chance of succeeding.<sup>73</sup> Dulles and Smoot had agreed that the negotiations for a reduction in the size of the garrison would be conducted by the Chief of the U.S. Army MAAG unit on Taiwan.<sup>74</sup>

#### THE ODD-EVEN CEASEFIRE PERIOD

In the face of the resumed Chinese Communist artillery fire no resupply was attempted since 40,000 tons had been landed on Quemoy during the period of the ceasefire (October 6 to 20) and there was no urgency for landing additional supplies.<sup>75</sup>

On October 21, in order to avoid any further intrusions into the three-mile territorial waters of Quemoy, U.S. naval ships were ordered to remain fifteen miles from Chinese Communist territory or GRC-held islands along the China mainland.<sup>76</sup> However on the same day, the GRC removed its ban on over-flights and air engagements.<sup>77</sup> On October 22, U.S. officials on Taiwan warned that the United States would renew its escort operations if the Communist artillery fire made it militarily necessary.<sup>78</sup>

On the 23rd the Taiwan Defense Commander reported

in view of the resumption of artillery fire

fire, he expected a request from the GRC very soon to resume convoy operations and hence needed authority to do so.<sup>79</sup> Eight hours later the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Burke, authorized the TDC to resume operations according to Paragraph 1a of JCS 2919262 of August, 1958, but his attention was called to the stipulation that he could escort only insofar as it was militarily necessary.<sup>80</sup> On October 25 the Taiwan Defense Commander informed CINCPAC that the GRC believed that the supply situation did not call for convoys and that therefore there was no request for increased U.S. activity.<sup>81</sup> On October 24 the final annex for conventional operations under CINCPAC OPS PLAN 25-58 had been issued with the publication of the 13th Air Force Annex N to provide for conventional war operations.<sup>82</sup>

Following the announcement of the even-day ceasefire on October 25, it was immediately clear to U.S. military and diplomatic officials in Washington that Chiang Kai-shek would be very unhappy about the firing procedure laid down by the Chinese Communists. As Smoot reported, the GRC did not like having to dance to the Chinese Communist tune. He warned that the GRC might try to resupply on

to report that for the moment he had talked Chiang out of trying to resupply on odd days. Smoot stressed that he had made it clear that the United States would refuse to escort on these days.<sup>83</sup> Nevertheless it was very clear that the firing pattern established by the Chinese Communists created tensions in U.S.-CPC relations and between Chiang and his military. If he did try to go in on the odd days, Chiang had to face up to the United States refusal to escort and therefore run the risk of the convoys being unsuccessful.

Both Washington and the Nationalist Chinese were aware that the odd-even day procedure was designed to sow dissension between them, but they saw no way to avoid it. Some of the Chinese Nationalist leaders, including Chiang Kai-shek, wanted to go in on the even days for prestige reasons, while recognizing the difficulty of making out a strong case. U.S. military leaders, while sympathizing with Chiang's feelings, were under strict orders not to go in when it was not militarily necessary and did not feel that they could justify requests to convoy on the odd days. On October 29 CINCPAC urged that the United States reiterate its support for the Offshore

and that the United States should discourage

Chiang from odd-day resupply operations in the face of Chinese Communist fire.<sup>84</sup> On October 30 an order went out from the CNO directing CINCPAC not to escort on odd days. In addition patrols were ordered to be kept outside the twelve-mile limit. The CNO informed CINCPAC that he concurred in the desirability of resuming patrols within twelve miles but that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had raised objections.<sup>85</sup>

Simultaneously Drumright was told that he should leave it to the GRC when to resupply and that the GRC should understand in advance that if it chose to resupply on odd days and if it attracted Chinese Communist interference, the United States would not necessarily engage in escort. The military need for escort was obviously lacking if the GRC could supply on even days.<sup>86</sup>

The issue of whether or not convoys on odd days should be escorted, which depended on whether the Chinese Communists fired on them, remained in abeyance through the end of October because rough seas prevented convoy resupply on both odd and even days and also because supplies on Quemoy had reached such high levels that resupply was not an urgent problem.

On November 5 Smoot reported that the GRC had begun resupply and was observing the odd-even day delivery schedule. The United States had advised that it could not provide assistance on the odd days because there was no military necessity to convoy on those days.<sup>87</sup>

On November 8 and 9, General Lawrence Kuter, U.S. Air Force Commander in the Pacific, met with a number of Chinese officials, including Chiang Kai-shek. He later reported that Chiang's principal point was the need to maintain air superiority and he noted his agreement with Chiang that the performance of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force had been one of the bright spots in the crisis. Chiang, Kuter wrote, claimed that there was considerable unrest in Peking and cited the firing of the Chief of Staff who, he claimed had originally argued for the Offshore Islands venture. Kuter however believed that Su was fired simply as a scapegoat.

Chiang believed, according to Kuter, that Khrushchev came to Peking to discuss the shift of attention from the Middle East and that Mao's military advisers, who had been urging an attempt to seize Quemoy and Matsu, concurred in Khrushchev's proposal that they attack. The green light

was then given to occupy the airfields. Chiang strongly impressed on Kuter that since the United States was not willing to use atomic weapons, it should strengthen the Quemoy conventional defense.

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\*Following his visit to Taiwan, Kuter wrote a letter to General Thomas White, Air Force Chief of Staff, in which he noted that the GRC military had hoped during September to maneuver the United States into a position where it would fight with the Nationalists for control of the mainland. They were now discouraged by Chiang's renunciation of force.<sup>89</sup>

A week later at an Air Force Commanders meeting, Kuter in a briefing on the crisis declared that the military had failed to convince the Government that it must be free to use suitable nuclear weapons at the outset of any conflict. He declared that the Communists could not be defeated with conventional weapons and suggested that the Air Force stress killion weapons. He concluded that "a priority requirement is to educate our various Government policy-makers that the very great spread in available nukes has made these weapons conventional."<sup>90</sup>

On December 31, in his final critique of the administration's reluctance to use nuclear weapons in the crisis, General Kuter in a letter to General Curtis LeMay, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, noted that he would not harangue LeMay with "well known and irrefutable arguments that demand that all our war plans be based on the use of atomic weapons." He asserted that he was alarmed by the growing trend of the Army, Navy and JAC of adopting plans for HE operations for limited war. He declared that the JCS directive to prepare for non-atomic operations was adopted without any resistance from CINCPAC and that therefore PACAF was required to take drastic action to fight in a manner for which it was not and should not be prepared to fight and had no chance of winning. Kuter expressed his view that to increase conventional capability would be disastrous. The employment of PACAF in extended island bombardment would completely deplete its war-  
success in a few days.

On November 11 the Taiwan Defense Commander reported to CINCPAC that while recognizing the need to prevent provocative action, he believed that the time had come to permit the Chinese Nationalists to resume patrol of the Taiwan Straits and to permit GRC aerial reconnaissance.<sup>92</sup>

Eleven days later CINCPAC informed the Chief of Naval Operations that its evaluation of the current situation was that it did not justify continuation of the currently committed U.S. augmented forces and that the Taiwan Defense Commander had concurred in this evaluation. He reported that CINCPACAF wanted a well publicized withdrawal but that he proposed a quiet one.<sup>93</sup>

On November 27 the JCS advised CINCPAC that it agreed that the situation did not require the continued presence of all the authorized forces. It thus authorized a redeployment of the entire attack CASAF TAC forces at the discretion of CINCPAC. Accepting the advice of CINCPAC and the TDC and rejecting the advice of PACAF, General Kuter, the JCS ordered a low-key withdrawal with no country visits and indicated that the GRC should be informed in advance.<sup>94</sup>

On December 2 CINCPAC advised CINCPACAF of this order

which provided for no announcement of the U.S. phased-down



TROOP REDUCTION ON QUEMOY

As has been noted, Dulles attached great importance to securing a reduction in the size of the Quemoy garrison as a gesture to indicate U.S. and GRC peaceful intentions. Chiang in his talks with Dulles had agreed that in principle he would not oppose such reduction provided his military officials were convinced that it was militarily sensible to do, but that he would not do it for political reasons.

On November 11 in a letter from Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far East, to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) John R. Irwin, reporting on Dulles' trip to Taiwan, Robertson noted that Dulles had suggested the possibility of reducing the garrison on Taiwan for sound military reasons, and not as a political gesture, but there was no detailed discussion or agreement. Chiang had indicated that he might move in this direction if there were a suspension of hostilities. "In case there was to be a suspension of hostilities of considerable duration, we might [Robertson wrote] wish to develop a program for redeployment of GRC forces involving a much more substantial reduction of such forces on the

Offshore Islands and the provision of further equipment to the GRC forces. I have in mind the kind of program put forward in a meeting between Secretary Dulles and the JCS on October 10. Under present conditions, however, a program of this magnitude does not appear feasible."<sup>96</sup>

On November 13 Chinese Nationalist Chief of Staff Wang and the head of the U.S. Army MAAG on Taiwan, General Dean, reached an oral agreement as follows:

(a) The United States would provide 12 additional 240-mm. howitzers and twelve 150-mm. guns, plus one additional M-24 tank unit for Quemoy.

(b) In return the GRC agreed to reduce its garrison by 15,000 men, including one infantry division.

Following this agreement Chiang summoned a conference of Smoot, Drumright, and the members of the MAAG unit and asked for more artillery.<sup>97</sup>

On November 14 Drumright reported that Chiang had agreed in principle to the manpower reduction, noting that the Nike battalion was increasing firepower in the area.<sup>98</sup>

While agreeing to a reduction in principle, Chiang urged a greater increase in tank firepower and artillery firepower than had been planned.<sup>99</sup>

On November 17 a formal agreement was signed between General Wang and General Dean which provided for an increase in artillery fire for the Offshore Islands and the withdrawal of not less than 15,000 men. The target date for completion was to be June 30.<sup>100</sup> The text of the formal agreement read as follows:

With respect to military defense of the Offshore Island Complexes of Kinmen [Quemoy] and Matsu, the undersigned agree as follows:

1. continued improvement of forces;
2. due to unusual conditions of terrain and logistics requirements, units on Offshore Islands shall be modified;
3. existing counter-battery artillery capability be augmented as follows:
  - a. Kinmen [Quemoy] complex--a minimum of 12 [additional] 240 mm howitzers, and a minimum of 12 [additional] 150 mm guns;
  - b. Matsu complex--240 mm howitzers and 4 more when available, 1 battalion of 155-mm guns, when available;
  - c. Further study of need for more;
  - d. Lacrosse missile considered at a later date;
4. armor strength on Kinmen [Quemoy] augmented:
  - a. a minimum of 1 tank battalion;
  - b. a study of tank strength.
5. services and combat support units will not be increased and will be reduced if possible.
6. reduction of forces on Kinmen [Quemoy] will include 1 infantry division and 1 additional division and/or individual so that there shall be a net reduction of not less than 15,000 men with a target date of 30 June 1959 for completion.<sup>101</sup>

On November 21 in commenting on his agreement, Dean

that he had been told by Dulles to do the

American 240's as a means of bargaining to obtain GRC agreement to reduce the strength on the Offshore Islands by at least 15,000 men. He reported that he had obtained Chiang's concurrence on the best possible terms.<sup>102</sup>

On November 28 General Peng, Commander in Chief of the Army of the Republic of China, in a conversation with General Taylor, stated that Chiang had agreed to a reduction of forces on Quemoy by 15,000 men, provided it were done gradually and firepower were increased. He listed the needed firepower increases and urged increased aid.<sup>103</sup>

On December 9, 1958, the formal U.S.-GRC agreement was approved by the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

By the end of December the United States had completed an agreement with the GRC which was to lead to reduction of approximately 15,000 men in the manpower on Quemoy.

#### DULLES AND THE ROLE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

On November 7 Secretary of State Dulles (accompanied by Herter, Murphy, Robertson, Smith and others from State) was at his request, briefed by a representative of the JCS

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at the Pentagon on the effects of nuclear weapons with particular reference to Taiwan.<sup>104</sup> At the conclusion of the briefing, which lasted less than an hour, Dulles asked whether nuclear weapons could be used to take out the artillery pieces opposite Quemoy without extensive civilian damage both in the Amoy area and on Quemoy and Taiwan. The colonel giving the briefing referred the question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>105</sup>

After much discussion of the subject and considerable disagreement both among the Services and between the Services and the Joint Staff, Dulles was informed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 8 that:

the batteries could be rendered ineffective by a combination of destruction or damage to the guns and gun emplacements and by inflicting casualties to the personnel operating these guns. By employing air-burst weapons, this could be accomplished with no significant radioactive fall-out implications in either the Amoy area or on Quemoy/Taiwan. Several types of atomic weapons and delivery systems, capable of achieving the above, are available in the area.<sup>106</sup>

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The first meeting of the Sino-American talks after the initial Chinese Communist ceasefire was held on October

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to get the Chinese Communists to extend the ceasefire indefinitely. He reported to the Chinese Communists that the United States was suspending its escort but would remain as the firing began again.<sup>107</sup> Wang responded by saying that the ceasefire was not a response to U.S. demands. He continued to demand that the talks be limited to U.S. withdrawal from the area and refused to discuss the possible length of the ceasefire.<sup>108</sup>

In October 13, the State Department instructed Beam to seek an agreement on a mutual reduction of provocation at the next meeting.<sup>109</sup> On the next day, Beam received further instructions for his next meeting with the Chinese Communists. He was told that the Chinese Communists' claim U.S. intrusion into the Offshore Islands might be based from their point of view in that there were differing standards of determining international airspace. The Chinese Communists, he was told might be using standards which would explain their continued charge of intrusions by routine patrols of the Seventh Fleet which were in fact keeping far more than twain miles from the Chinese coast as the United States defined it. Beam was told that the United States would

accept a reciprocal statement of non-provocative actions even without GRC concurrence.<sup>110</sup>

At the meeting on October 15, Wang questioned the ability of the United States to speak for the GRC on the renunciation of force.<sup>111</sup>

At the next meeting of the Warsaw talks held on October 25, Wang noted that the U.S. Commander of the Seventh Fleet had announced that his forces had nuclear weapons and were prepared to use them at an hour's notice. He declared that the only issue was U.S. action in the area, and defended the twelve-mile limit claimed by Communist China.<sup>112</sup> Beam noted that the Chinese Communists seem to be chagrined at the poor showing of their Air Force and at the GRC getting modern weapons. In evaluating the meeting, Beam reported that Wang displayed a relaxed attitude at the 82d meeting and proposed a two week recess.<sup>113</sup> This proposal was accepted and publicly announced.

At the next meeting on November 5, Beam pressed for a Chinese Communist statement renouncing the use of force.<sup>114</sup> However Beam informed Washington that he had gotten nowhere with this and that in fact Wang was very abusiv



at this meeting about U.S. interference in the civil war. Beam reported that Wang had denied the appropriateness of the U.S. analogies to other divided states, and had protested the supply of poison gas to the GRC.<sup>115</sup> Wang also charged that the United States had sent atomic-guided missiles to Taiwan to attack the mainland.<sup>116</sup>

In evaluating this meeting, Beam reported that Wang appeared to be just going through the motions. Wang also wanted to restrict the talks to the Taiwan issue and refused to be drawn into a discussion of the U.S. prisoners whom the Chinese Communists were continuing to hold.<sup>117</sup>

The Warsaw talks had returned to being a completely routine exchange of charges and demands.

#### ACTIVITY IN WASHINGTON

On October 24 Dulles returned to Washington and briefed his staff and then the President on his talks with Chiang.<sup>118</sup>

On October 28 the Washington intelligence community produced its final SNIE on the crisis in which it concluded that the Chinese Communists had not initiated the crisis with the firm intention of obtaining the Offshore

noted that the failure to use the Chinese Communist Air Force for offensive action and less than maximum artillery strength indicated that this was less than a total effort.

The SNIE evaluated the motives of the Chinese as follows:

(a) probe U.S. intentions; (b) drive a wedge in U.S.-GRC relations; (c) discredit U.S. and GRC; (d) remind the world that Communist China was to be reckoned with; (e) prevent development of a two-China situation; (f) reduce the morale of the GRC.

It concluded that the Soviets probably did not initiate the action but had encouraged and supported it.<sup>119</sup>

On the same day, Admiral Post, the Director of the Far East Division in ISA of the Department of Defense, in testimony before an executive session of a House Committee, discussed the problems raised by "intransigence on both Chinese sides." Admiral Post expressed the belief that the Chinese Communists had stopped because their operation had failed. He declared that the United States was in a better position because the GRC was stronger and at the same time had renounced the use of force to return to the mainland.<sup>120</sup>

At a press conference on October 28, Dulles declared that the intermittent shelling had no military purpose.

He asserted that the Chinese Communists had recognized that they could not impose a blockade and were trying to save face. He believed that the Communists would not expand the scope of their operations and that their objective was Taiwan and not the Offshore Islands.<sup>121</sup> On the next day Dulles held his last State Department staff meeting on the crisis.

A legal defense of the U.S. position during the crisis was presented on November 20 by Ely Maurer, Assistant Legal Advisor of the State Department. In the talk Maurer stressed the wide latitude given the President by the Formosa Resolution. He identified "Quemoy" as consisting of the two Tans as well as the two Quemoy.<sup>122</sup>

A paper presented to the Taiwan Defense Command by the GRC Ministry of National Defense on December 25, 1958, summarized the main deficiencies in the crisis operations as seen by the GRC. The report noted that the Chinese Air Force had not been permitted to bomb airfields occupied by the Communists in late July which threatened the Offshore Islands as well as Taiwan. The failure to bomb the artillery opposite Quemoy enabled the Communists to use their superior firepower to bring the Islands under

The crisis, according to the report, demonstrated

the need for augmenting the Chinese Navy and Air Force and increasing both supplies and manpower on the Offshore Islands. The GRC summary warned that enemy air attacks could pose a serious threat to the Islands and stated that this was only the end of round one. It hailed close military cooperation between the United States and the GRC as the major success of the crisis.<sup>123</sup>

Following the crisis the Joint Chiefs were asked by the National Security Council staff to produce a paper on lessons learned from the Quemoy crisis. The request was transmitted by the Joint Chiefs to the Services as well as to their own staff and to CINCPAC and his subordinate commands. A number of "lessons learned" papers were produced at various levels (and are available) stressing the need for clearer political direction and a decision on whether nuclear weapons would be used. The papers by and large assumed that American policy had been successful because the United States had stood firm. The papers also dealt with a variety of technical subjects including the need for improved communication facilities. On February 9 the Joint Chiefs finally produced a paper on "Lessons Learned from the Lebanon and Quemoy Crises" which stressed

the need for more comprehensive political guidance and more understanding on the part of political leaders of the implications of restrictions put on the use of military force. The paper concluded that artillery bombardment alone, however intense, did not appear sufficient to stop resupply of Quemoy.<sup>124</sup>

On the following day Twining met with Gordon Gray of the National Security Council staff and was informed that there no longer existed a need for a formal JCS paper on lessons learned from the Quemoy crisis and thus the paper was withdrawn.<sup>125</sup>

The crisis in the Taiwan Straits was over. The lessons learned, if any, would be reflected not in a single paper but in many operations of the Government.